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LUTHER AND THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF
RESISTANCE

TO LEGITIMATE

AUTHORITY

BY CYNTHIAGRANT SHOENBERGER

The works of Martin Luther and of other early Protestant writers
are often completely neglected by students and scholars of political
thought in this country. If his period is considered at all, Luther is
generally dealt with cursorily, as a stepping-stone to Calvin and the
Huguenots, essential to political and intellectual history but not very
interesting in his own right. The impression frequently given is that
Luther was a latter-day Augustine in his views of secular authority,
endorsing its legitimacy for the Christian and counselling strict obedience to the powers-that-be.
One reason for this conclusion, which I contend is a mistaken one,
is that the writings translated, collected, and anthologized for academic
use are those which Luther wrote during the early years of his clash
with the Roman church and the associated notion of a universal Christendom representedby the Holy Roman Empire. Reading, for example,
the 1523 work, Temporal Authority, the student finds that Luther was
concerned to "provide a sound basis for the civil law and sword, so no
one will doubt that it is in the world by God's will and ordinance."'
The image of the political system which pervaded the work was of a
hierarchicalorder of authoritiesestablished by God. Power flowed downwards, and those in inferior positions were obligated to obey those set
above them in the hierarchy. The implications for the possibility of
resistance in Germany were clear: although the use of force might be
permissible against an equal or inferior authority, a prince could never
justly wage war against his overlord, the emperor.2It went without saying that a private subject might never actively resist the authorities set
over him, but Luther nonetheless allowed for the possibility of refusal
to obey in cases when the prince trespassedupon the jurisdiction belonging of right only to God. Under such circumstances the Christian's two
duties, to God and to his prince, might come into conflict; and the
proper response to such a dilemma was that which Saint Augustine had
prescribed-passive resistance, that is, to disobey but submit to whatever punishment might be assigned for disobedience.3
1 Luther, Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should be Obeyed (1523), in
Luther's Works (hereafter Works) (55 vols.; St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955-75),
XLV, 85.
2 Ibid., 124-25.
3Ibid., 112.
3
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What is often forgotten about Temporal Authority is that it was
written out of Luther's concern about the excessive interference of the
Catholic Church in secular affairs, during a period when he had not yet
abandoned hope that the Emperor Charles V might support him in that
concern. Like so many of Luther's writings, it was directed toward
a particularsituation; it was not intended to provide a definitive theory
of political obligation. Moreover, the mistaken impression that Luther
never condoned any form of active resistance is strengthened in the
minds of political theorists by knowledge of his response to the outbreak
of the Peasants War, when despite his original sympathy with their
demands Luther issued a series of vituperous pamphlets4 encouraging
the German princes to put down the rebellious peasants with all necessary means. The excessively bloody results, as well as the intemperate
language used by Luther, entrenched the notion of him as an indiscriminate supporter of the government in power, however brutal.
This fundamentally erroneous conclusion can be corrected only by
tracing the evolution of Luther's thought on the subject of resistance
beyond the early 1520s, through the period when the Protestant League
of Schmalkaldenwas founded, and during the years of intense, though
intermittent, hostilities preceding the 1547-51 war between the Emperor Charles V and the evangelical cities and states. Luther himself
died in 1546, before the outbreak of full-scale armed strife; but during
the years when he felt his church to be imminently threatened, his
opinion on active resistance to the Emperor underwent radical change.
Since he was not a writer of elaborate theoretical Summae, the development of his thought on this issue can only be understood through examination of his correspondence, public debates, and private conversations, or Tischreden, as recorded by students who frequently dined in
the Luther household. These materials are not easily accessible to the
English reader, since they have by and large not been translated from
the original archaic German and/or Latin, and are rarely included in
the anthologies used by American students of political thought.5
Luther's Early Position on Resistance
Before turning to those later writings, it is very important to understand the situation Luther faced after his dramatic break with the
Roman church in 1517. He was entirely dependent upon the protection
4 For
example, Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the
Peasants in Swabia (1525), in Works, XLVI, 17-43; Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants (1525), in Works, XLVI, 49-55; and An Open Letter
on the Harsh Book against the Peasants (1525), in Works, XLVI, 63-85.
5Although never included in the anthologies in common use, some of these
materials are not inaccessible to the English reader who is a serious student of
Luther, for a number are included in.the American edition of Luther's Works.
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of the evangelical princes, and it was only through the intervention of
the Elector Frederick of Saxony, who arranged for Luther to be kidnapped and placed under protective custody after his condemnation
at the 1521 Diet of Worms, that he escaped capture and perhaps death
by the forces of Emperor Charles V and Pope Leo X. Thus, despite
the revolutionary individualistic overtones of his theology, with its
proclamation of the priesthood of all believers, the validity of the individual conscience, and the church as a community of all the faithful,
Luther did not wish to lose the support of the Protestant princes by
arousing fears of a general popular rebellion. He urged that the Reform
be carried out in an orderly fashion by the established authorities and
warned against overzealous measures by the population at large, such as
iconoclasm and the interruptionof Masses.6 The use of violence in the
service of Reform, he thought, resulted more frequently in harm than
benefit and could succeed only in discrediting the Lutherans.7Thus both
political and pragmatic considerationsled Luther at this time to oppose
disruption of the establishedorder.
Such considerations were supported both by Luther's ethical convictions and by factors of temperament.He was shocked and frightened
by the disorders he witnessed during his brief secret visit from Wartburg
Castle to Wittenberg in 1521, as well as by the anarchic conditions he
observed en route in Thuringia.8The deep distrust of spontaneous popular activity evidenced in his letters from this period and in his pamphlets about the Peasants War was deepened by an extreme personal fear
of disorder.
Luther had, as well, a strong tendency toward pacifism. The use of
force, he thought, more often than not resulted in worse situations than
those it was intended to remedy. From his examination of history he
concluded that revolutions were rare that resulted in governments better
than those overthrown and that no government could remain stable if its
rulers were exposed to such dangers as tyrannicide.9He thought accordingly that resistance was both fruitless and highly risky.
Moreover, Luther remained obsessed by a theological concern
which was based on his somewhat Augustinian, determinist view of history. History being in God's hands, He would take care of His own;
For example, Letter to the Princes of Saxony Concerning the Rebellious Spirit
(1524), in Works, XL, 49-59; Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of
Images and Sacraments (1525), Pt. I, in Works, XL, 75-143; and Letters to the City
Council of Danzig (May 5, 1525), in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel, hereafter W. A. (Weimar Aufgabe) Briefe, (Weimar, 1930-48), III, 483-86.
7 A Sincere Admonition
by Martin Luther to all Christians to Guard against Insurrection and Rebellion (1522), in Works, XLV, 53-74.
8 Ernest Schwiebert, Luther and his Times (St. Louis, 1950), 540.
9 Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (1526),
Works, XLVI, 105-107, 112.
6
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and any display of self-help might be interpreted as a declaration of
lack of faith in Providence. In other words, Luther was convinced that
any Christian who believed in such measures as tyrannicide, deposition, and armed rebellion betrayed a fundamental lack of faith in God,
who would Himself punish tyrants, alone, presumably by manipulating
the diseases and natural disasters at his command, or through the use
of human agents, such as foreign rulers. Even the tyrant's own subjects
might serve as God's instruments, but Luther believed that they would
be condemned for so doing.10Thus no Christian concerned for his own
soul would involve himself in resistance of any sort.
In sum, then, Luther seems during this early period of his public
life to have consistently opposed resistance, on several grounds. His
concern at this time was, first of all, with strengthening the state, the
instrument upon which he relied for reform of the church, against the
secular power of the papacy. And the impression he received from the
civil disturbancesof this era confirmed his belief that a strong state was
necessary to restrain the evil nature of man. If the masses were really
as sinful and ignorant as they appeared to be, they were clearly incapable of governing themselves. Moreover, if anarchic violence was
just below the surface of civil society, the proclamation of any right of
resistance, however limited, would be very dangerous. Thus Luther invariably denied the justifiability of resistance. On the other hand, he
never insisted upon unconditional obedience; and many of the theoretical distinctions he espoused were to prove suggestive when a Lutheran
theory of resistance was developed. His delineation of spheres of secular
and spiritual authority, for example, provided a basis for ascertaining
when resistance was to be undertaken. In addition, although Luther
emphatically ruled out the possibility of resistance by private individuals, the position of the magistrateinvolved the possibility of conflict. On
the one hand, the German princes and lower magistrates were inferior
in status to the Emperor; on the other, they as rulers had been charged
by God with the protection of their subjects. Their intermediateposition
in the governmental hierarchy could thus place them in a moral quandary if the Emperor decided to attack their Protestant subjects. While
Luther at this time decided that their obligation to the Emperor must
take priority, other Lutherans concluded the opposite.'1
10Ibid., 109-110.

1 I am greatlyindebtedto Richard
Roy Benert,whose personalassistanceand
Politicaland LegalThought"
scholarship,"InferiorMagistratesin Sixteenth-Century
(unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,Departmentof History, University of Minnesota,
1964), directedmy attentionto many critical sources on the developmentof legal
and theologicalargumentsfor resistance,as well as their acceptanceby Melanchthon
and, eventually,by Lutherhimself.

LUTHER

ON RESISTANCE

TO AUTHORITY

7

Luther's Reluctant "Conversion"
From the early 1520s on, Luther was subjected to a great deal of
pressure on the question of resistance. In 1523 the Elector Frederick of
Saxony asked for his opinion as to "whether a prince might by war
protect his subjects from persecution by the Emperor or other princes
on account of their faith." Luther did not give him much encouragement, replying that the Elector should act only if his opponent were a
prince of equal rank.1' The other theologians from whom opinions
were sought at the same time, however, dissented somewhat from
Luther's position; and these chinks in the Wittenberg front widened as
the political situation grew worse. For example, Johannes Bugenhagen,
a theologian close to Luther, answered in 1523 that a prince was required to protect his subjects against injustice from whatever source,
just as he would protect them against robbery or murder. As servants
of the law, possessors of the sword, and protectors of their people, the
princes thus had the right to resist the Emperor.13By 1529 Bugenhagen
had organized his thoughts on this subject into a lengthy treatise which
he presented to the Elector, thus confirming the fact that there was considerable support among the theological faculty for resistance; the
arguments in it were built around two fundamentally Lutheran concepts, the notion of spheres of secular and spiritual authority and the
duty of the prince or magistrate to protect his subjects.14
This increasing theological support, as well as the political situation,
encouraged Saxony to participatein the negotiations over the formation
of a defensive military alliance among the various Protestant cities and
states. The politician most actively involved in this alliance project was
Philip of Hesse, who carried on an active correspondence with the
various evangelical princes and city councils in an attempt to gain their
adherence to such a league. A series of war scares--the 1528 rumor
that a Catholic league was preparing to attack Protestant strongholds,
the withdrawal by the Emperor in 1529 of all past concessions to the
Lutherans, and the failure of the 1530 Diet of Augsburg to resolve the
continuing dispute-seemed to underline the extreme urgency behind
Philip's efforts.
12

Luther, Gutachten (for Elector Frederick of Saxony, shortly before Feb. 8,
1523), in Heinz Scheible (ed.), Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen
Protestanten, 1523-1546, Vol. X of Texte zur Kirchen-und Theologiegeschichte, ed.
Gerhard Ruhbach (Giitersloh, 1969), 17.
13
Bugenhagen, in Scheible, 18.
14 Bugenhagen, "Bedencken auff die
Frage: ob man das Evangelium, wider den
Keyser, mit dem Schwerdt schiitzen moge?" (to Elector John of Saxony, 1529), in
Friedrich Hortleder, Handlungen und Ausschreiben . . . Von Rechtmdssigkeit, Anfang, Fort- und endlichen Ausgang des Teutschen Kriegs Keyser Karls dess funfften
(2nd ed.; Gotha, 1645), II, 63-65.
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Thus the anxiety of the Saxon Elector (in 1525 John had succeeded
Frederick in that post) increased, and Luther's blessing was sought once
again. But he still refused to approve participation in a league against
the Emperor. The Protestant princes, Luther thought, would be justified
in protecting their subjects against attack by equal-ranking princes, so
long as they did not attack them pre-emptively. Such action would not
qualify as resistance to higher authority. The problem, of course, was
that the Catholic princes claimed that they were acting upon the Emperor's command; and thus resistance to them had to be equated with
resistance to the Emperor. Luther questioned this identification of the
two authorities. The Catholic princes' plan, he charged, had been formulated without the Emperor's knowledge. Moreover, if they were
claiming authority under the 1521 Edict of Worms, any such mandate
was invalid, since it had been passed by a minority of the Estates and
the right of appeal to the Emperor remained.15
Luther's arguments were somewhat specious, but they allowed him
to avoid coming to terms with the issue of resistance. The Edict of
Worms had indeed been passed by a minority of the Estates, but only
because many of the Protestant princes had voluntarily absented themselves; and the result of an appeal to the Emperor seemed a foregone
conclusion. Thus, although his contention allowed him to offer an affirmative answer to the specific question whether the Protestants might resist
an attack by Catholic princes, it was clear that the real matter at issue,
resistance to the Emperor, did not have his approval. This was the message conveyed to the Saxon Elector; and, in large part because of
Luther's equivocal attitude on the question of resistance, the proposed
alliance was not concluded at that time.
But while Luther refused his support, the jurists in the employ of
the Elector were beginning to marshal legal arguments in support of
resistance. In response to Philip of Hesse's continuing pleas, a great
debate, carried on through formal communiques and opinions, began
among the lawyers and theologians attached to the courts and councils
of the Protestant areas still in doubt over the justifiability of resistance
to the Emperor; and out of this debate constitutional arguments for
resistance began to be elaborated.16These arguments, based upon a
notion of the Empire as a limited monarchy, were an additional weapon
15 To
Gregory Briick, Chancellor of Electoral Saxony (March 28, 1528), W. A.
Briefe, IV, 421-24.
16 Hans
Baron, in "Religion and Politics in the German Imperial Cities during
the Reformation," English Historical Review, 12(1937), 406-413, describes the intense debate carried on in 1529 among representatives of the imperial cities which
were evangelical and the Protestant princes, notably Philip of Hesse. Documents
from this controversy are available in Scheible and in Hans von Schubert, Bekenntnisbildung und Religionspolitik: 1529/30 (1524-1534) (Gotha, 1910).
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for Philip of Hesse in his attempt to gain allies. He wrote, for example,
to the Margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach(who ultimately did not adhere to the Schmalkaldic League) that the relationship between the
Emperor and the inferior magistrates, a category used to include both
the princes and city governments who held Electoral status under the
terms of the 1356 Golden Bull and those who did not, was a conditional
one. If the Emperor departed from his duty to abide by the terms of
his election and to act according to standards of justice in dealing with
the princes and cities, then the fundamental reason for which he had
been elected, the maintenance of the laws, would vanish, and with it
his authority. The obligation of the inferior magistrates to protect their
subjects would remain, nonetheless; and they were bound to exercise it
against a tyrannical Emperor, just as they would against the violent
attack of the Turks.17
Philip later elaboratedupon these constitutional and legal arguments
in a direct appeal to Luther himself. The nature of the German Empire
was such, Philip said, that the Emperor was not only limited by fundamental laws but also obligated to share this authority with the German
princes. These princes had a unique status vis a vis the Emperor, one
unparalleledin Scripture; their position had been described by one of
the Schmalkaldic propagandists as collectively superior to that of the
Emperor, since they had the right to elect him.'8 In any case, Philip
argued, Charles V violated the agreement upon which his authority
rested when he proceeded against any prince with force, when he failed
to give a fair hearing to the Protestants'case, and when he acted with
only the approval of a minority of the Estates in a matter which was
clearly one for settlement by a Council.19
As late as March 1530, however, Luther remained in agreement
with the theologians and jurists who opposed resistance to the Emperor.
Unless he were formally deposed by the Electors, he thought, the princes
remained bound to obey him. They need not, indeed must not, cooperate with his designs; but actively to resist him in defense of their
Protestant subjects was strictly forbidden.20Thus Luther maintained
his formal opposition to resistance throughout most of 1530; but, on the
evidence of an anonymous opinion written at Wittenberg in the same
year, many of his associates had already begun to accept constitutional
17 Letter from
Philip of Hesse to Margrave George of Brandenburg-Ansbach
(Dec. 21, 1529), in Scheible, 44-46.
18 "Ein Theologischer Rathschlag von Nirnberg: Dass nicht alle, sondern nur
die ordentliche Gewalt von Gott. Unnd dass derowegen die Untere Obrigkeit im
Reich wol befugt, wider die unordentliche Gewalt dess Obern in GlaubensSachen,
ihre Underthanen zu schitzen," in Hortleder, II, 84-85.
19Philip of Hesse to Luther (Oct. 21, 1530), W. A. Briefe, V, 653-54.
20 To Elector John of
Saxony (Mar. 6, 1530), W. A. Briefe, V, 258-61.
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arguments for resistance. Their conclusions seemed similar to those of
Philip of Hesse. If the princes under German law were, as they described
them, "pillars of the Empire," co-rulers with its head, and shared his
responsibility to look after the welfare of the whole, then they were
merely acting as executors of the German constitution in protecting
their subjects against him, and not in their own interest.2'
The pressures upon Luther culminated in the calling of a public
disputation at Torgau in October and November 1530. The Elector
John intended thereby to force the Wittenberg theologians into an open
confrontation with the Saxon jurists and thus to obtain a definitive
resolution of his ethical and legal dilemma. The legal experts presented
their position first, insisting that the Emperor was elected upon specific
conditions and was to rule in conjunction with the Estates. If he violated the laws of the Empire, as he had done by proceeding against the
Protestants when their appeal to a Council was still pending, all their
obligations to him were erased.22Relying heavily upon Roman and
canon law, the lawyers asserted that the princes and estates might resist
the Emperor in situations similar to those in which a private individual
could lawfully disobey a judge and resist the execution of his sentence:
when he made a ruling on a matter not within his jurisdiction; when he
passed a sentence involving clear and irreparable injustice; and when
the proceduresfor appeal were not respected. Analogously, the Emperor
had attempted to execute his judgment in matters of religion, which did
not fall within his jurisdiction; his decision was, in the Protestants'
judgment, clearly wrong and involved irreparabledamage in the possible
loss of souls; and procedurallaw had been violated when the Emperor
continued to execute his judgment while the appeals were still pending.23
These arguments were very similar to those which have been described above and which Luther had already rejected, yet at Torgau they
seem at last to have gained his acquiescence. In the name of all the
Wittenberg theologians, Luther presented a brief opinion admitting that,
although they had always preached nonresistance in the past, the theologians had not realized that the constitution of the Empire in fact provided for resistance under certain circumstances: "For when we previously taught, positively never to resist the established authority, we
did not know that such a right was granted by the laws of that very
authority, which we have at all times diligently instructed people to
obey."24Thus the pastors with this brief declaration essentially passed
the question of resistance to the jurists.
21 "Ein
Theologisches Bedencken," in Hortleder, II, 68.
22 Gutachten der Kursichsischen Juristen
(shortly before Oct. 26, 1530), in
23 Ibid.
Scheible, 63-66.
24 "Erklirung Luthers, Jonas', Melanchthons,
Spalatins und anderer Theologen
und protokollarische Aufzeichnung fiber die weitern Voten der Theologen und
Juristen" (Oct. 26-28, 1530), in Scheible, 67. Translation mine.
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It is important to note that in voicing this new position Luther based
his stand solely upon the cautious, tightly circumscribed grounds of
constitutional law. Arguments based on natural law, more open and
generalizable, he specifically rejected, although the jurists had marshalled them in support of their own opinion. In a letter to Lazarus
Spengler in February 1531, Luther described how the jurists at Torgau
had tried to get the theologians to agree to base resistance upon the
principles that it was permitted to repel force with force (vim vi repellere licet) and that active resistance was permitted in cases of notorious injury, both arguments ultimately based on the natural right
of self-defense. Luther had refused to agree. The right to resist, he
repeated, stemmed from the fact that the Emperor's own laws, which
all must observe, required resistance in certain circumstances:
Renderunto the Emperor,what is the Emperor's.And it is the Emperor's
right, that he must be resisted in matters of notorious injustice. . . . All that

the Emperorhas established,that is, the law of the Emperor,is to be observed. But that law determines,that one must resist him in such a case.25
There are also indications in this and other letters from the same
period that Luther had been extremely reluctant to embrace a proresistance position and that he continued to be so. In the letter to
Spengler, as in one to Wenceslaus Link in January and to "a citizen
of Ntirnberg"in March, he made references to his old opinions on resistance, implying that he still considered passivity to be the better
course.26Yet in each of these letters he also repeated what he had said
to Spengler, that the law of the Empire seemed to allow resistance. The
decision on whether any particular individual would undertake such a
course, however, he left to the individual's own conscience, guided by
the expert opinions of the lawyers. He himself would not offer counsel
in one direction or the other. Thus he clearly did not regard his Torgau
opinion as a call to arms, which could never provide an effective substitute for trust in God.
A similar attitude pervaded the "exhortation"which Luther finally
produced in response to Philip of Hesse's request. The Warnung an
seine lieben Deutschen was not, however, quite what Philip had in mind.
In it Luther specifically disclaimed the intent to summon anyone to
resistance, although he said that he did not condemn the kind of defensive war which he thought imminent.27He directed his words not to
the Protestantsbut to their potential opponents instead. It was the duty
25Luther to Lazarus Spengler (Feb. 15, 1531), W. A. Briefe, VI, 37. Translation mine.
26 Luther to Wenceslaus Link
(Jan. 15, 1531), W. A. Briefe, VI, 16-17, 56-57.
27 W.
A., XXX, iii, 278, 282-83. Luther's Warning has also been translated in
the American edition of his Works; and the editors briefly discuss Luther's changing attitude toward resistance and the political context in which this evolution was
taking place (Works, XLVII, 5-9).

12

CYNTHIA GRANT SHOENBERGER

of all German Christians, he thought, to disobey the Emperor, who was
acting "not only against God and divine law, but also against his own
imperial laws, oaths, duty, seals, and letters" by, for example, seeking
to condemn the Protestants without giving their case a fair hearing.28
Private citizens should therefore refuse both to obey their Emperor and
to participate in the war on his side. However, only those who had
public authority to do so, and that seemed in the light of the jurists'
arguments to include the princes, should actively oppose the Emperor.29
Luther himself did not recommend any particular course of action, except to pray for aid and to hope for peace; but the impact of the
Warnungwas publicly to confirm his support, however cautious, for the
Protestant princes' undertaking.
Luther's Torgau "conversion" has been a source of considerable
controversy among German scholars familiar with this period.30Some
have asserted that Luther's conclusion was virtually extorted from him
by the Saxon Chancellor-an astonishing belief about a man who had
stood up to Pope and Emperor with legendary courage. It is my opinion
that Luther's change of heart was genuine, if somewhat grudging. He
had indeed always preached obedience to the civil law, and primarily
because he thought it embodied God's own will. Thus when his hierarchical image of the Empire collided with the jurists' contention that
it was in fact an elective arrangementamong rulers who were in many
respects equal, he was compelled to acknowledge a constitutionallybased right to resist. The Christian, he believed, must follow the rules
relevant to the sphere of activity in which he was engaged; and in this
case it was not Luther but the jurists who were experts on those regulations. Different rules might apply in the Kingdom of God; but the
Christian was not to be condemned when he did not follow them all
here, even though he might thereby incur some sin. Sin, however, was
an inevitable part of the human condition.
In any case, the Lutheran politicians assumed from Torgau on that
they had Luther's blessing. The withdrawal of his opposition removed
the last obstacle to Saxon participation in Philip of Hesse's league, and
it was concluded on February 27, 1531. This marked a significant turning point. The league, over which so much debate had been spent, was
28

W. A., XXX, iii, 291 284 ff. Translation mine.
29 Ibid., 299-30.
For example, Karl Miller, Luthers Ausserungen iiber das Recht der bewagneten Widerstands gegen den Kaiser, in Sitzungsberichte der k6niglichen bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften. phil.-hist. Klasse VIII (Munich, 1915), 43-45, 52 ff.
and Pierre Mesnard, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique an XVIe Siecle (Paris,
1936), 228, both of whom feel that this opinion contradicts Luther's whole philosophy and that he had merely given in to the princes. For the opposing view, see
Fritz Kern, "Luther und das Widerstandsrecht," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung ffir
Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, 6(1916), 336.
30
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now a fact. Luther was far too loyal to the groups involved to challenge
it, once in existence. In a treatise of the next year, he implored both
sides to keep the peace; yet if he were to counsel the Lutherans not
to arm themselves under the circumstances, he felt, it would be equivalent to serving as a Catholic propagandist. He would be sanctioning the
vast advantage of the already heavily-armed imperial forces and submitting his flock to the slaughter. The Protestants, he concluded, were
merely defending themselves against those who would shed innocent
blood; and the sin was upon the conscience of the Catholic forces.31
Luther's Increasing Conviction during the 1530s and 1540s
The best argument that Luther's "conversion"was indeed genuine is
to be found in his correspondence and table talk of the years following
the confrontation at Torgau. During this period, he remained convinced
by the argument that resistance by the princes to the Emperor was
constitutionally permissible;and his understandingof the imperial structure became more sophisticated. Throughout the decade Luther re-peatedly emphasized the limited and conditional nature of the Emperor's
power in Germany, describing the government as "biirgerlich," one
which, in contrast to an absolute monarchy, was circumscribedby legal
relationships.32The Emperor'spower was strictly and specificallybounded by the obligations he had undertakenat his coronation: "He is sternly
commanded and bound by his duties, yes, he has promised, vowed and
sworn with his own oath, to administer justly the police, laws, rights,
and orders of the Empire.

.

.."33

By 1539 Luther's constitutional conception had become clearer and
more elaborate. The Emperor's obligations, he thought, included not
only the duty to uphold certain laws and procedures, but to share his
authority with the other princes as well. In a February 1539 letter to a
pastor in Cotbus giving advice about how to preach on the subject of
resistance, he wrote that "the Emperor is not a monarch and cannot depose the electoral princes nor alter the form of the Empire."34Hence,
in Luther's opinion, the Emperor shared his power in many important
respects with the German princes, making the Empire more an aristocracy than the monarchy Charles envisaged. This conception was in fact
the subject of discussion at Luther's table the day before he wrote the
letter just mentioned, and he very explicitly distinguished the position
31 Wider den Meuchler zu Dresden (1531), W.A., XXX, iii, 456-57, 461.
32 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Tischreden
(hereafter W.A. Tischreden) II, 407
(Aug.-Dec., 1531).
33 W. A. Tischreden, I, 327 (first half of the 1530s). Translation mine.
34 Luther an Joh. Ludicke, Prediger in Kottbus (Feb. 8, 1539), W. A. Briefe,
VIII, 367. Translation mine.
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of the Hapsburg Emperor in Germany from that of a king in other
nations:
Secondly,the Emperoris not a monarchin Germanyas the kings of France
and Englandare monarchsin theirrealms,but seven electorsare at the same
time membersof the political body with the Emperorand are membersof
the Emperor;upon them also the care of the Empire is imposed, though
not in the first instance.Thus the seven are equal in power with the Emperor, althoughnot equal in dignity.35
The power of the electors, then, was equal to that of the Emperor, a
situation Luther viewed as analogous to that of the rector of a university, who governed it in conjunction with his colleagues. The co-rulers
served to moderate the Emperor; and they-and the other princesmight under certain circumstances resist him.36 In fact, whenever the
Emperor acted flagrantly in contempt of the law, it became justified to
resist him as a tyrant: "Thus when he violates these same laws and acts
in contradiction of them, then we could justly resist him, as a tyrant,
who exercises power and acts in opposition to his duty."37This was the
situation which Luther thought existed in Germany at that time, since
the Emperor had ignored the appeal which was the constitutional right
of the Protestant princes and had proceeded against them with force.
A very likely source of Luther's newly developing image of the German
Empire was his close associate Philip Melanchthon. As early as 1530,
while characterizingdifferent types of kingdoms in his Commentary on
the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics, Melanchthon described the imperial Electors in a way parallel to Luther's own later description:
There is, therefore,anotherkind of kingdom,a supremerule, but one qualified by an establishedlaw. Certainnations have supplementedtheir kings
with guardians,who have the right of reproving the kings. Just as the
Lacedaemonians added ephors . . . in Germany there are electors, in

France there are certainprinces of the parlement,who act as if they were
the ephorsof the kings.38
The historical implications of the ephor argument were clear, and it
seems highly likely that Melanchthon, always more the scholar, tutored
Luther in them.
In the early 1530s, moreover, Melanchthon also accepted natural
law argumentsfor resistance, endorsing the right of self-defense in cases
of "atrocious injury" and upholding the identity of natural and divine
35 W. A. Tischreden, IV, 236-37 (Feb. 7, 1539). Translation mine.

36 Ibid., 237.
W. A. Tischreden, II, 407 (Aug.-Dec., 1531), Translation mine.
38 Melanchthon, Philippi Melanthonis
Opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Karl
Bretschneider and Heinrich E. Bindseil (28 vols:I-XXVIII of Corpus Reformatorum
[hereafter CR]; Halle, 1834-1860), XVI, 440. Translation mine.
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law.39 Melanchthon was thus readier than Luther at this time to embrace

a natural law basis for resistance, and he emphasized it from then on
far more than positive or constitutional law. His Prolegomena to Cicero's
Offices, written in 1530, contained Melanchthon's clearest statement of
both the natural law argument and the doctrine of resistance by inferior
magistrates:
Animals resist violence out of a natural instinct, for the instinct of selfpreservationhas been instilledby God in every nature; in man, however,
two things lead to the resistance of unjust violence . . . [one is] the instinct

for one's own preservation,the other thing is the notion, which teaches . . .
that the humanrace is so establishedas to preserveequality.
It is thereforea true saying, [that]naturepermitsthe repellingof force with
force, but natural knowledgeteaches that this is to be understoodin a
specialway: [namely,that] it is permittedto repel unjustforce with authorized force, clearlyby the office of the magistrate,when it is possible to use
his aid, or by one's own hand, in the absenceof a magistrate.. .40
Such a formulation prefigured a strand of thought which was to enter
Lutheran discussion with increasing frequency during the 1530s and
1540s and which was destined to become central to the evolving theory
of resistance. If, indeed, all creatures had a divinely-instilledinstinct of
self-preservation, an impulse to defend themselves which was an ineradicable part of their natures, then, almost by definition, resistance
under conditions of self-defense could not but be justified. There might
still be room to clarify the conditions under which it should take place;
but resistance itself was nonetheless a natural right, in the most fundamental and, in fact, extremely modern sense of that term.
Natural law arguments-the concepts of "atrocious injury," of
self-defense, and of the prince's duty to protect his subjects-had
thus become crucial to Melanchthon's justification of resistance before
Luther was willing to acknowledge any of them. Yet by the late 1530s
many of these elements made their way into his thought as well. At
first he began to support the idea, which he had specifically rejected in
1530, that the territorial princes were obligated to resist the Emperor
in defense of their subjects' souls, bodies, and possessions. In the Wittenberg theologians' third formal opinion, which Luther signed though
he was not the author, the conclusion is drawn that "every prince is
obligated therefore primarily to protect and to maintain the Christians
and the true external service of God against all unjust power; as also
39Melanchthon to Heinrich von Einsiedel (1532), in Johann Erhard Kapp,
Kleine Nachlese einiger, grissten Theils noch ungedruckter und sonderlich zur
Erlduterung der Reformations-Geschichte niitzlicher Urkunden (Leipzig, 1727),
204.
40 Prolegomena in Officia Ciceronis, CR, XVI, 573. Translation mine.
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otherwise a prince is obligated in worldly things, to protect a virtuous
subject against unjust force."41The authors specifically included in this
category resistance against the Emperor himself, even when he was
acting with the proper authority, and implied that such action would be
justified to protect subjects against both spiritual and worldly oppression. Indeed, when the theologians reiterated this view in 1538, they
made explicit that this was the case:
It is our duty to watchover and defend[our subjects],if someone,the magistrateor other,undertaketo compelthemto acceptidolatryand the forbidden
divine service. Likewise, if someone should undertaketo exercise unjust
power againsttheir subjects.42
What is most interesting about this 1538 opinion is that the right
to resist in defense of certain values was openly related to natural law.
The theologians drew a parallel between the right of a prince to defend
his subjects and the right and duty under natural law to protect one's
wife and children:
Every father is obliged, accordingto his ability, to protect his wife and
childrenagainstoutrightmurder,and thereis no differencebetweena private
murdererand the Emperorwhen he undertakes[to exercise] unjust force
outside of his office, and especially, open or notorious unjust force. For
open violence annuls all duty betweensubjects and superiorsaccordingto
natural law.43

The jurists' argument based on the concept of notorious injury had thus
been accepted; natural law was no longer shunned; and-what is more
astonishing-resistance by a private individual seems to have been contemplated.
Some Luther scholars make much of the fact that he was not the
principal author of these later Wittenberg opinions, taking this as evidence that Luther never really abandoned his initial antipathy to resistance.44It is quite true that Melanchthonwas the most probable author
of the Wittenberg proclamations of the 1530s, since they correspond so
closely to his own position and to the specific formulations he had given
it. Yet it is significant, at the least, that Luther was willing to add his
name to the list of signatures; and owing to his prominence it always
41

Luther, Jonas, Bugenhagen, Amsdorf, Cruciger, Melanchthon, Gutachten, for
Elector John Frederick of Saxony (Dec. 6, 1536), in Scheible, 89-90. Translation
mine.
42 Luther, Jonas, Bucer, Melanchthon, Gutachten, for Elector John Frederick
of
Saxony and Landgrave Philip of Hesse (Nov. 13-14, 1538), in Scheible, 93. Translation mine.
43 Ibid. Translation mine.
44 Scholars of this opinion include Muller, op. cit., 68, and Herman
Doerries,
"Luther und das Widerstandsrecht," Wort and Stunde, III (Gittingen, 1970), 240.
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appeared first among the subscribers.For a man of great integrity, who
insisted upon conviction over compromise, this willingness, in my mind,
signified an underlying agreement.
More important, one can trace the evolution of a similar view in
the accounts of Luther's table talk from the early 1530s. The question
whether one might defend oneself against a robber or murdererwas discussed repeatedly, and Luther's answer was always in the affirmative.45
The reason was that, in the absence of a magistrate, the individual had
the right to protect himself or others against the use of force; in fact,
the individual was obliged to do so, since in such a case he represented
the public authority and must uphold the political order on its behalf.46
This view found its way into a public disputation in 1539:
For just as the magistrate,of whom you are a member,himself resists injustice,thus he commandsand ordersyou also to resistunjustforce . . . For
you know that the magistratehas commandedand ordered [you] to resist
murderers,and to protect his citizens and subjects.47
The analogy drawn was to the right to resist the Emperor when he acted
like a common robber or murderer, thereby losing the special authority
he had over his subjects.48This parallel was articulated by identifying
it with some kind of collective self-defense:
If, however,I caught someone,who was not exactly a tyrant,with my wife
or daughter,so would I want to kill him. Likewiseif he took by force from
this one his wife, from anotherhis daughter,from a thirdhis field and goods,
and the citizens and subjectscame together,and could no longer tolerateor
endurehis violence and tyranny;so could they kill him just as they would
anothermurdereror robberon the street.49
Thus many individuals who had been wronged in similar ways might
organize to exercise together the right of defense which they all possessed
individually, and rid themselves of the tyrannical magistrate.
Working in this way from a double analogy-the parallel rght of
individuals and magistrates to protect "their own50"and the similarity
between a robber-murdererand the tyrannical Emperor-Luther concluded with a definite hint that resistance might be offered by individuals
in the last resort. The individual, unlike his magistrate,could only resist
in defense of himself or of those in his care, and not on behalf of his
faith,5' but the two might well become assimilated in the case of a religious war:
45 For

example, W. A. Tischreden, II, 224-25 (Sept. 20-Oct. 21, 1532).
46 Ibid., II, 406 (Aug.-Dec., 1531); IV, 237 (Feb. 7, 1539).
47 Luther, "Etliche
Schluss-reden," Hortleder, II, 98. Translation mine.
48 W. A. Tischreden, I, 326-27 (first half of the 1530s).
49 Ibid., I, 558-59 (first half of the
1530s). Translation mine.
50 Ibid., III, 631-32 (Apr. 3, 1538); IV, 308-310 (Mar. 21, 1539).
51Ibid., II, 224-25 (Sept. 20-Oct. 21, 1532); II, 406 (Aug.-Dec., 1531).
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This is not a theologicalmatterbut a legal one. If the emperorundertakes
war he will be a tyrant and will oppose our ministryand religionand then
he will also oppose our civil and domestic life. Here there is no question
whetherit's permissibleto fightfor one's faith. On the contrary,it's necessary
to fightfor one's childrenand family.52
By the end of the 1530s, a situation under which such resistance
might be permitted, or even required, seemed to have arrived. After
nearly a decade of relative peace following the war scare of 1530, the
atmosphere again became highly charged. Charles V appeared ready to
attack the Lutherans by 1539; and the Protestants, under the leadership
of Philip of Hesse, were determined to resist forcibly. Luther's personal
outlook became increasinglyapocalyptic.He no longer saw the conflict as
one between two levels of government but as a battle in the last great
clash between Christ's representativeson earth and the devil. The Pope
was Antichrist and the Emperor his agent; and as such he could justly
be resisted:
Thus as it is just now to fight againstthe Turk in order to defend oneself,
how muchmore is it now rightto fight againstthe Pope, who is muchworse
than the Turks... . . Thus we shall judge the Emperorin this case not to be
the Emperor,but a soldierand mercenaryof the Pope.53
It may seem that Luther was hereby attempting again to avoid the
generalized question of resistance, and in a sense he was. If the times
were extreme-the final days, perhaps-then such a defense of resistance could hardly be applied to more ordinary circumstances. In
continuing to depict the Emperor as a mere instrument of the Pope,
moreover, rather than as an independent political actor, Luther can be
interpretedas merely reasserting the necessity to resist the intervention
of the Roman hierarchy in temporal affairs. As the Emperor's independent personality was thus submerged in his role as an agent of the
Pope, Luther began to conclude that anyone, private persons included,
could resist him without awaiting any formal judgment or condemnation.54This contention clearly went far beyond anything that Luther had
been willing to accept up to that time.
Under crisis conditions, Philip of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony
arranged yet another public disputation on the right to resist the Em
peror; it was held in April and May 1539, with Luther participating.
The most important new distinction to emerge from this debate was
Luther'sconcept of the "Beerwolf,"who, in contrast to a mere tyrant, not
only broke the law but also overturnedthe entire moral order upon which
52
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53Lutheran Joh. Ludicke, Predigerin Kottbus (Feb. 8, 1539), W. A. Briefe,
VIII, 367. Translationmine.
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it was based. All the subjects of such a ruler, and not just the inferior
magistrates, had the right to resist and even to kill him and all his supporters.55The point, of course, was that Luther thought the Emperor
and the Pope were just such apocalyptic tyrants, and that the present
situation justified all efforts to resist them.
To conclude then: having startedfrom a position of complete opposition to resistance of any kind, Luther came eventually to embrace a notion of resistance based on constitutional and positive law and finally
even on natural law. He did tend to describe each of the contingencies
in which he justified resistance as a strategic exception to an underlying
belief in non-resistance, either as a violation of the unique structure of
the German Empire or as applicable by definition only to a very special
and extreme case. Luther's reluctance and great caution on this issue
were evident; and he was always torn between a perfectionist ethic and
the necessity of acting in a world in which the existence of his church was
endangered by the intentions of the Emperor, the Pope, and Catholic
princes. Lack of faith in the use of force intensifiedhis caution. Certainly
forcible resistance was meant to be a last resort and even then to be
exercised in a carefully circumscribed manner; but it is significant that
each time his church was in peril during the 1530s and 1540s, Luther
did on one or another ground allow the possibility of resistance.
Moreover, Luther's pronouncementsupon this issue were interpreted
by Protestants in the years after his death as evidence that the initiator
of the Reform had sanctioned resistance. In 1546, for example, his 1530
Warnungan seine lieben Deutschen was republished with a preface by
Melanchthon; and it and the tract Wider den Meuchler zu Dresden were
cited by the Lutheranswho led the city of Magdeburg'sfamous year-long
defianceof the Emperor in 1550.56In addition, his 1539 letter to Lubeck
of Cotbus and the "Etliche Schliiss-Reden"(the relevant theses from the
1539 disputation) were both updated and republished as publicity for
the SchmalkaldicLeague in 1547.57
Even more important, the writings of Luther and his associates, such
as Bugenhagen, Melanchthon, the pastors at Magdeburg, the Protestant
jurists and princes, had an influence far beyond the narrow issues of the
Schmalkaldic War, as they were read by and influenced Protestants in
France, Holland, and the British Isles.58Luther, it is true, for political
55 W.A., XXXIX, ii, 41-42.
Bekenntnis Unterricht und Vermanung der Pfarrhern und Prediger der Christlichen Kirchen zu Magdeburgk (Magdeburg, Apr. 13, 1550), Pt. II.
57 Oscar Waldeck, "Die Publizistik des Schmalkaldischen Krieges I," Archiv fir
Reformationsgeschichte, 7(1909-1910), 40-42.
58 For example, Irmgard Hoss, "Zur Genesis der Widerstandslehre
Bezas,"
Archiv fir Reformationsgeschichte, 54(1963), 198-214; Robert M. Kingdon, "The
Political Resistance of the Calvinists in France and the Low Countries," Church
History, 27(Sept., 1958), 220-33.
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as well as temperamentalreasons, shied away from the democratic implications of many resistance theories, upholding the right of the princes
to resist the Emperor but denying a similar right to the princes' subjects.
The constitutional framework of the German Empire, in which the
princes were concerned with asserting their autonomy vis a vis the crossnational political structure of the Middle Ages, made this limited argument possible; but in France such a legal situation did not exist. Huguenot writers-Francis Hotman, Theodore Beza, and the author of the
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos-were interested rather in establishing the
right of "popular"representatives,such as the Estates or parlements, to
control succession to the French throne and to approve new legislation
and taxation.59Thus the element of popular sovereignty, which had been
present in inchoate medieval notions of resistance, was reintroduced by
the French writers, with their theories of an elective and limited monarchy based upon an original contract and depending upon the continuing approval of such popular representatives.Yet when they turned to
the question of resistance, the Huguenots drew very heavily upon legal
and theoretical justifications which had already been elaborated by the
Lutherans.
It is true that the Lutheransthemselveshad drawn upon the medieval
formulations sketched out by Roman and canon lawyers, as well as upon
scholastic sources. The German Protestants, however, then elaborated
these notions and applied them to the situation of a Protestant minority
being oppressed by a Catholic superior. Thus they provided arguments
on behalf of resistancein a form especially relevant to the predicamentof
the Calvinists, who then recombined them with the medieval tradition in
a particularlyrevolutionaryfashion.
This analysis of the evolution of the modern theory of resistance
assigns to the Lutherans, therefore, a pivotal role, which has not usually
been recognized. At the very least, it is clear that Luther himself was
not unalterably opposed to the notion that legitimate yet oppressive
political authority might be resisted. Hence Lutherans do not share a
heritage of submissivenessto the powers-that-be.On the contrary, in an
important sense the early modern theory of resistance underwent significant development on German soil; and, despite the fact that many of
his own notions were derived from the arguments of others, a key figure
in the developmentof resistancetheory, owing to his vast moral influence,
was Martin Luther.
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